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Abstract: We argue that the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)
has evolved into a hybrid of two design variants, allowance trading (cap-and-
trade) and credit trading (performance standard rate trading), with an added
feature of industry support to minimize carbon leakage. In particular the current
rules tying free allowances to production capacity expansion, plant closure and
capacity use have transformed the efficient cap-and-trade program that stood at
the origins of the EU ETS into a system that even surpasses credit trading in
paying hidden product subsidies to firms. This combination of rules encourages
an inefficiently high level of investment in production capacity and an ineffi-
ciently high output in industries exposed to international competition. The
result is a sub-optimal EU Emissions Trading ‘Hybrid’ (which we therefore
label as ‘EU ETH’).
Keywords: European Union Emissions Trading System, economic efficiency,
cap-and-trade, performance standard rate trading, carbon leakage
JEL codes: D21, D62, K32, Q48, Q54
1 Introduction
The idea of creating pollution markets received considerable attention by some
of the founding fathers of law and economics, such as Calabresi and Melamed
(1972) building upon Coase (1960). The concept has moved from theory to
practice and is now firmly embedded in environmental law. The European
Union (EU), for instance, has been building up experience with carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions trading since 2005 (e. g. Faure and Peeters, 2008). The original
EU Emissions Trading Directive determines the rules applying in the first period
2005–2007 and the second period 2008–2012 (Directive 2003/87/EC). The
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European Parliament and the Council of the European Union have since adopted
an amending Emissions Trading Directive introducing some new rules to apply
in the current and third period 2013–2020 (Directive 2009/29/EC). Early 2018 the
European Council approved another reform of the EU Emissions Trading System
(EU ETS) for the next and fourth period 2021–2030 (Directive (EU) 2018/410). In
this paper we aim to examine which rules have changed between the first and
the third period and how efficiently the reduction of CO2 emissions is currently
being achieved under the EU ETS. Our economic analysis thus focuses on legal
amendments made to the EU ETS so far (2005–2020), leaving an analysis of the
next period’s rules (2021–2030) for future research.
We start with a survey of the economic-analytical literature on emissions
trading and use that knowledge to assess the efficiency of the original EU
Emissions Trading Directive of 2003 and its deterioration due to the changes
after 2013. We will explain why the additional rules applying to capacity expan-
sion and plant closure lead to sub-optimal outcomes. A next set of new rules
added an extra criterion for the allocation of free allowances by tying their
number to the level of operations relative to capacity. Although this was possi-
bly meant as a reparation, we will argue that this has in fact done further
damage to the efficiency of the scheme. The various rather complex criteria for
the allocation of free allowances did already receive attention by a number of
scholars, such as Ahman and Holmgren (2006), Ellerman (2008), Christin et al.
(2011), Meunier et al. (2014) and Branger et al. (2015). However, the niche of our
paper is that we: (a) perform the analysis based on the conceptual distinction
between allowance trading (cap-and-trade) and credit trading (performance
standard rate trading); (b) use the current laws and regulations to model firm
behaviour under the amended EU ETS; and (c) clarify - in two tables - how the
successive revisions of rules in the past have affected corporate decisions and
hence the efficiency of EU ETS.
In Section 2 the two basic systems are introduced in which emissions are
traded with and without a fixed cap: allowance trading (cap-and-trade) and
credit trading (performance standard rate trading), respectively. In a survey
of the literature, provided in Section 3, the two blueprints are compared, in
particular regarding their efficiency. In Section 4 we discuss the rules of the
EU ETS that applied from 2008 to 2012 and then consider the new rules that
apply from 2013 to 2020 (and beyond). In Section 5 it is shown that in the
previous period 2008–2012 there is already some merging of the two basic
concepts of emissions trading and that this merging has become more
pronounced under the rules that apply from 2013 onwards. This leads us to
argue that the EU ETS is increasingly becoming a hybrid system. Here we
thus make a point that differs from Endres and Ohl (2005), who mention
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that the separation between a trading sector (covered by the EU ETS) and a
non-trading sector (where the EU ETS does not apply) has created a
hybrid system. Our contribution instead focuses on the features of the EU
ETS itself as a hybrid offspring of two distinct emissions trading schemes
which undermines its efficiency. The impact of the EU ETS on sectors
exposed to international competition and on carbon leakage is the subject
of Section 6. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 Two emissions trading concepts
In order to understand the economic consequences of the current legal design of
the EU ETS, it is necessary to comprehend the conceptual difference between
two basic variants of emissions trading (Nentjes and Woerdman, 2012). In the
one system, trade is carried out subject to an emissions cap, which is referred to
as ‘cap-and-trade’ (CAT) or ‘allowance trading’. The other system is based on
tradable emission reduction credits, also referred to as ‘credit trading’ (CT),
‘performance standard rate trading’ (PSRT), ‘output-based allocation’, ‘tradable
reduction certificates’ or ‘dynamic allocation’.
Law and economics literature traces the original concept of emissions trading
back to Demsetz (1967), who argues that externalities should be internalized by
allocating property rights, and ultimately to the exposition of Coase (1960) that
bargaining will lead to a cost-efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation
of property rights (assuming transaction costs are negligible). In the environmen-
tal and resource economics literature, Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) are men-
tioned as the first scholars to propose emissions trading in the specific form of
cap-and-trade, with Montgomery (1972) as the one who provided the formal proof
of its cost efficiency. The essence of cap-and-trade is the absolute cap on the total
number of allowances, which is made available periodically either by handing
them out for free or by way of auction. About twenty years after the birth of the
concept of cap-and-trade, the United States (US) Congress turned it into actual
policy in 1989 by making a cap-and-trade program for sulphur dioxide (SO2)
emissions the cornerstone of its strategy to control acid rain. The latter scheme
started in 1995 and it succeeded to realize the planned cap on total emissions in
2007, three years before its statutory deadline of 2010. Despite its success, the US
SO2 trading program ‘collapsed’ in 2011 after a series of regulatory changes and
judicial actions (Evans and Woodward, 2013).
Performance standard rate trading (PSRT), also referred to as credit trading
(CT), did not start its life as a conceptual construct. In the process of
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implementing the Clean Air Act, the instrument evolved in the US in the 1970s
and 1980s in subsequent steps, brought together under the label ‘EPA emissions
trading program’. This particular policy emerged to bring flexibility into the
strict command-and-control regulation of emissions in areas with air quality
worse than the national ambient standard. PSRT sets an emissions standard (or:
intensity standard), which is usual in direct regulation, but supplements it with
the option to compensate emissions higher than the standard at one source by
emissions lower than the standard at another internal or external source.
Therefore, PSRT is trade in reductions in emissions control that go beyond the
reductions required by the performance standard. Tietenberg (1980, 1985:chpt. 1)
provided a description and economic analysis of the trade in emission reduction
credits (ERCs) under the EPA scheme, which is an early form of PSRT (Nentjes
and Woerdman, 2012: 5).
It took more than two decades before the insight began to dawn that cap-
and-trade and setting a performance standard with the option to trade emissions
above and below the standard are instruments that differ not only in cost
efficiency but also in their impact on the volume of output. The first step was
set by Helfand (1991). In his basic model a ceiling on a firm’s total emissions
leads to the highest efficiency and to a lower level of output than setting a
standard mandating emissions per unit. However, it took another decade before
economists started to apply a similar analysis to a scheme of emissions stan-
dards where emission reduction credits are traded between sources and com-
pared the outcome with cap-and-trade (e. g. Fischer, 2001; Dewees, 2001; Gielen
et al., 2002; Woerdman, 2002:chpt. 5; Boom and Nentjes, 2003; Boom and
Dijkstra, 2009).
The different histories of CAT and CT underline that the two are distinct
instruments of environmental policy. The cap-and-trade system imposes a cap
on the annual emissions of a group of companies for a period of years. The
emission rights are allocated to established companies for the entire period,
either for free or through an annual sale at auction (a combination is also
possible). Newcomers and companies seeking to expand must purchase rights
from established companies (or from a government reserve), while a firm closing
down a plant can sell its emission rights. The system of tradable reduction
credits, however, is based on a mandatory emissions standard (mandated emis-
sions per unit of energy consumption or per unit of added value) adopted for a
group of companies. Emission reduction credits can be earned by emitting less
than is prescribed by the emissions standard. The credits can then be sold to
companies who can use them to compensate their emissions in excess of the
emissions standard applying to them.
4 E. Woerdman and A. Nentjes
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3 Efficiency in emissions trading design
We will first discuss cost efficiency and then economic efficiency of emissions
trading design. Cost efficiency means that abatement costs are minimized when
companies aim for an emissions target at a given level of output. Economic
efficiency means that welfare is maximized under an emissions target which can
be achieved by reducing emissions or by reducing output. Below we will argue
that economic efficiency is crucial for understanding the difference between cap-
and-trade (CAT) and credit trading (CT).
3.1 Cost efficiency
Baumol and Oates (1971) demonstrated that prices can be put to more uses than
internalizing environmental externalities, as proposed by Pigou (1920), namely
to bring cost efficiency in pollution control. Cost efficiency or cost effectiveness
is achieved when total emissions of the industry are cut back to the emissions
target at the lowest possible abatement cost (e. g. Tietenberg, 2000:chpt. 3). In a
CT scheme, companies with high compliance costs will buy emission reductions
from companies able to comply with the emissions standard at a lower cost. The
individual firm minimizes total compliance cost by abating up to the level where
marginal abatement cost equals the market price of credits. The same is true
under CAT, where the firm is free either to control emissions or to leave emis-
sions unabated and buy allowances. Similar to CT, the individual firm minimizes
total compliance cost by equalizing marginal abatement cost and market
allowance price. The marginal control costs of all sources are equalized and
consequently total control costs are minimal. Hence both CT and CAT establish a
cost-efficient allocation of pollution abatement: it is the price set on not abating
pollution and consequently rewarding control of emissions that gives firms the
incentive to control emissions cost-efficiently.
3.2 Economic efficiency
We define economic efficiency as the maximization of the sum of consumer
surplus plus producer surplus created by the production of an industry (e. g.
Viscusi et al., 1992:chpt. 4). In environmental policy, this is equivalent to the
minimization of the loss of surplus caused by reducing total emissions of an
industry to the target level. Below we will show that CAT and CT differ in
economic efficiency.
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3.2.1 Decisions at firm level
A firm may achieve emission reductions by more intensive emission reductions
at a given level of output or by lowering production itself. The firm will prefer to
decrease output when this is less costly than using abatement technology. The
problem with PSRT is that reducing total output does not save on abatement
costs because it mandates emissions per unit of output. At a lower level of
production, the emissions standard is still the same and as costly as before. CT
only rewards the individual source for cutting back emissions below mandated
emissions per unit of output. The sale of credits granted for these emission
reductions enables the buyer to emit more than the standard requires. This
transaction does not change the average emissions per unit of output of the
industry, which remain equal to the standard set by the regulator.
CAT with free allowances works out differently because of the emissions cap
(e. g. Nentjes and Woerdman, 2012). A firm that reduces emissions by cutting
back production remains entitled to emissions equal to its cap. With output at a
lower level it can choose an abatement technology that has lower costs because
it leaves more emissions per unit of output unabated. Combining a relatively low
level of output and high emissions per unit of output can be profitable for firms
with high marginal abatement cost. They will select this option if less intensive
abatement delivers a cost saving that exceeds the loss in net revenue arising
from selling less output. In such a case, the industry under CAT thus operates at
a lower level of output and higher emissions per unit of output than the industry
would under PSRT.
The cap on firm emissions has the consequence that the allowances
allocated for free to the firm are a cost of production. Free allowances used
to offset emissions from production have an opportunity cost because the
allowances have to be handed over to the authority and cannot be used a
second time. The opportunity cost of allowances used up for a unit of output is
equal to the cost of abating the emissions of the marginal unit of output, and
simultaneously equal to the market price per allowance multiplied with the
number of allowances needed per unit of output (e. g. Grafton and Devlin,
1996; Woerdman et al., 2008, 2009). The opportunity cost of free allowances is
a component of the marginal cost of the product, as much as the expenditure
for purchasing allowances at auction would be.
Free allowances under CAT thus differ fundamentally from the free mandated
emissions under CT. Increase of output in a CT scheme entitles the firm to extra
mandated emissions, which means that they cannot possibly be a cost of that
output. However, the allowance price in a CAT scheme with auctioned allowances
is not different from the market price in a scheme with free allowances (under
6 E. Woerdman and A. Nentjes
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perfect competition): the cost of allowances raises the market price of output in an
identical manner. That said, we do note that auctioning allowances generates
public revenues, which can be used to create a ‘double dividend’ by compensating
for lowering taxes that distort incentives to work, save and invest (e. g. Goulder,
1995; Goulder et al., 1999).
Consequently, a firm under CT only pays for abatement and not for man-
dated residual emissions. The component lacking in the marginal cost of output
is calculated by multiplying the mandated emissions of the additional product
with either the marginal cost of abating emissions or with the price of an
emission reduction certificate (Boom and Dijkstra, 2009). The non-included
abatement cost of marginal output under a performance standard has been
interpreted as an implicit output subsidy (Helfand, 1991), which also holds for
PSRT (e. g. Fischer, 2001; Dewees, 2001; Boom, 2006:chpt. 4; Boom and Dijkstra,
2009; Holland, 2012). Bernard et al. (2007) classify the implicit subsidy as out-
put-based rebating, which is a subsidy on output meant to offset the higher
production costs caused by environmental regulation.
3.2.2 Market equilibrium and industry output
Because the mandated emissions in a CT scheme are not a cost for the firm, the
marginal cost of output function and thus also the supply curve of the industry
is situated below the same function and curve under CAT. In long-run market
equilibrium, the price of output is therefore lower in CT than in CAT and the
output of the industry is larger in CT than in CAT.
If emissions per unit of output are equal under both schemes, the higher
level of output in CT would result in higher total emissions of the industry than
in CAT, which is also what happened in lab experiments by Buckley et al. (2007).
Therefore, assuming that the public authority wants to achieve a certain target
level for the industry’s total emissions, the performance standard under CT
(in terms of emissions per unit of output) has to be more stringent than the
emissions per unit of output under CAT. As a result, the abatement level of the
industry in CT is higher than in CAT.
In spite of more intensive abatement under CT, the marginal cost of output
and hence the product price is still lower than under CAT (Boom, 2006:chpt. 4).
Output in long-run market equilibrium is higher in CT than in CAT. This has two
consequences. Firstly, the emissions standard under CT must be more stringent
than the emissions per unit of output under CAT to achieve the same target level
of emissions for the industry. Higher abatement per unit of output implies higher
marginal abatement costs so that the price of credits in CT is higher than the price
Emissions Trading Hybrids 7
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of allowances in CAT (Boom and Dijkstra, 2009). Secondly, the adoption of an
emissions trading scheme in the EU could lead to carbon leakage: the moving of
investments or production, and thus emissions, to countries outside the EU where
an emissions pricing system has not (yet) been adopted (e. g. Matthes, 2008).
Because of its implicit output subsidy and lower product price, CT is more
effective in minimizing carbon leakage than CAT (Holland, 2012; Weishaar, 2007).
3.2.3 Industry output, market structure and economic efficiency
The difference between the two emissions trading designs in terms of levels of
output and abatement has consequences for their impact on welfare. We shall
first discuss their differences in economic efficiency when there is perfect
competition in the market for output, followed by an analysis of what the impact
is when output is sold on a market with imperfect competition.
Economic efficiency when competition is perfect
Maximum welfare (or: surplus) requires (a) that the marginal production cost
equals the marginal benefit of the product for each consumer and (b) that it
contains all cost components. When competition is perfect, the first condition is
met both under CAT and CT, but the second condition is only met under CAT.
CAT is not only cost efficient but also economically efficient by transmitting the
shadow price of abatement into the price of output.
Nevertheless, CT is more flexible than CAT. In an economic recession,
production declines and emissions therefore decrease. CAT would then result
in allowance oversupply and an allowance price drop, because the cap and thus
allowed emissions do not change, unless there is a regulatory device to tighten
the cap. The allowed emissions under CT, however, are automatically reduced in
case of a recession, as a result of which credit oversupply would not occur. Their
relative performance is reversed, however, in case of an economic boom. CT
could lead to a situation where total industry emissions would overflow their
target level, unless the emissions standard is tightened. CAT, however, would
prevent emissions from surpassing the emissions cap, which would also
increase the allowance price.
CT’s aforementioned flexibility also comes at an economic cost. The supply
price of the product under PSRT does not signal that abating the residual
emissions of the marginal product has a cost. Consumers then buy too much
of the product at a price that is too low. Welfare (the total surplus) would be
higher if output were lower and abatement as well (Boom, 2006:chpt. 4). Models
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assuming uniform firms without emissions trading come to a similar conclusion
(e. g. Helfand, 1991; Ebert, 1998; Dijkstra, 1999:chpt. 3; Fischer, 2001; Boom and
Dijkstra, 2009; Holland et al., 2009). In simulations of PSRT, Boom (2006: chpt.
4) finds that the loss of surplus, because of high abatement necessary to offset
the emissions of too high output, can be up to 20% higher than the loss of
surplus in CAT. Likewise, in a simulation by Holland et al. (2009) of a low-
carbon fuel standard to attain a given level of CO2 emissions in the US, it is
shown that the loss in total surplus due to abatement cost is about 2.5 to 5 times
higher under CT compared to CAT (depending on the elasticity of fuel supply
and demand).
When competition on the allowance market and product market are perfect,
CT is cost efficient but not economically efficient because the benefits of a
(small) part of output are lower than the costs, due to the abatement of the
extra mandated emissions of that output. CAT is economically efficient, because
it reduces emissions through lower production where that is less costly than
spending extra money on emissions control.
Economic efficiency when competition is imperfect
In a monopolistic or oligopolistic product market without environmental policy,
output is below the economically efficient level. When the authority introduces
environmental policy through CAT, the output shrinks further than if CT would
be used. In this case, PSRT could have an advantage because it leads to higher
output and a higher number of firms compared to CAT (Dijkstra, 1999:chpt. 3;
Boom, 2006:chpt. 4). Although CT seems to bring higher welfare than CAT under
imperfect competition, we have seen that CT also leads to higher abatement
costs than CAT. Their ranking in terms of welfare ultimately depends on the size
of these effects (Boom, 2006:chpt. 4; Boom and Dijkstra, 2009).
Building upon earlier analyses of a perfect allowance market under an
imperfect output market (Malueg, 1990; Ebert, 1998), De Vries (2003:chpt. 8)
finds that CAT performs better on welfare than CT when the difference in
emissions per product is small but when this difference is high the ranking is
reversed (see also Boom, 2006:chpt. 4, expanding e. g. Sartzetakis, 2004). Where
De Vries (2003:chpt. 8) and Boom (2006:chpt. 4) maximize the consumer plus
producer surplus under the constraint of an emissions ceiling, Holland (2012)
maximizes this surplus minus the environmental damage from emissions. He
interprets the missing emission cost component under CT as a (hidden) con-
sumption subsidy, which can be neutralized by an equal tax on output, whereas
CAT works out the way that a combination of an equal subsidy and tax on
consumption would do. In a second-best world, however, welfare is maximized
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by setting the ‘corrective’ tax at a lower level. Despite differences in modeling
and terminology, Holland’s conclusions are on a par with those of De Vries
(2003) and Boom (2006).
3.4 Impact of combining emissions trading concepts on
efficiency
We have shown that industry’s total output is higher, and emissions per unit of
output are lower, in CT compared to CAT. Therefore, the abatement effort under
CT has to be higher and consequently marginal cost of abatement is higher too
compared to CAT, so that the credit price under CT is higher than the allowance
price under CAT.
Now suppose that CAT is used for output sector A and PSRT for output
sector B. What would happen if firms in sector B are allowed to buy and use
allowances to cover emissions in sector A et vice versa? Fischer (2003) concludes
that trade between CAT and PSRT sectors will lead to higher total emissions,
assuming that the regulator will not set a more stringent emissions standard. If
we drop this assumption, the government may adjust the emissions standards in
the PSRT sector to avoid the total emissions ceiling being exceeded. Boom and
Dijkstra (2009) show that, when trade is opened between the two sectors, the
credit price is initially higher than the allowance price. Firms in the PSRT sector
will buy allowances from firms in the CAT sector and trading leads to an
equalization of allowance and certificate price. If the output of the two sectors
is sold in different markets, firms in the PSRT sector see their average cost of
output go down, so that the product price decreases and output is higher. For
the CAT sector, average costs of output go up, leading to an increase in the
product price and to a lower level of production. Therefore, allowing emissions
trading between the two sectors leads to an increase in the discrepancy in
output.
To see the similarities and differences between the above-mentioned emis-
sions trading design concepts and the real-life EU ETS, we first have to present
its basic legal rules and some of the changes therein.
4 Revised emissions trading rules
What do the rules for emissions trading and their amendments so far look like in
the EU? The story begins at the end of the previous century, when a European
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carbon tax turned out to be politically unacceptable. After that fiasco, the
European Commission set its sights on emission rights allocated for free under
an emissions cap. The Commission got support from the European Parliament
and from the Council of Ministers for such a cap-and-trade system, initially for
the period 2008–2012. In shaping the Emissions Trading Directive 2003/87/EC,
however, two political compromises were made which are totally alien to the
original concept of cap-and-trade as outlined above. First, emission rights,
called ‘allowances’ in the EU ETS, also have to be allocated for free to new-
comers and expanding companies. The number of allowances for a company
will be based on their output capacity. Second, member states are at liberty to
decide whether the rights shall lapse on the closure of a plant. Both modifica-
tions basically merged the cap-and-trade system of the EU ETS with a credit
trading system that also allows higher total emissions in case of firm expansion
and does not allow the sale of emission rights when an installation closes.
Fairness concerns are likely to have played a role in this decision making
process (e. g. Heilmayr and Bradbury, 2011): not treating incumbents and new-
comers equally would have been politically unacceptable. De Bruyn et al. (2008)
point out that it is primarily the industry that advocated such modifications.
Under the amending Emissions Trading Directive 2009/29/EC, the EU set out
the rules of play for emissions trading related to the period 2013–2020 (and
beyond). New in comparison with the previous period is, among other things,
the phased lowering of the cap rather than a constant cap. Not just CO2, but also
nitrous oxide (N2O) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs) are now targeted. Quite surpris-
ing, from the perspective of political acceptability, is the gradual conversion
from the allocation of rights for free to sale at auction. The reason for this
change is the unforeseen consumer opposition against the windfall profits that
electricity producers incurred by passing through the opportunity costs of free
allowances in the electricity price (Woerdman et al., 2008). Another change is
that each member state is now obliged to allocate rights for free to newcomers
and to those investing in extra capacity (rather than this being an option for
them). Furthermore, in all member states the surrendering of rights is obligatory
when a plant is closed or its capacity reduced.
The total emissions cap for 2013, and thus the number of emission rights,
has been determined for each member state. In the period 2013–2020 the cap in
each member state is lowered by 1.74% per year. The amending 2009 Directive
stated that ultimately all allowances are intended to be sold at auction: starting
with 20% of the total in 2013, increasing annually up to 70% in 2020 and finally
intended at 100% in 2027. This process is speeded up in the power sector: in this
sector all rights are sold at auction since 2013, except in East European member
states where this must be achieved by 2020. Member states are free to decide
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how to spend the auction revenue, but the political intent is that at least 50% of
this revenue is used for climate measures.
An exception has been made for carbon-intensive sectors competing on an
international product market with companies established in countries where no
emissions cap applies: 100% of the allowances allocated to these sectors is
allocated for free during the entire period 2013–2020. The number of emission
rights available for this category declines in line with the total cap for all
companies. The giving away of allowances to established companies takes
place on the basis of a carbon standard per unit of production multiplied by
production in 2005 (or the average for 2005–2007 if this is higher). This stan-
dard, referred to as ‘ex ante benchmark’, is determined based on the average
emissions of the 10% installations with the lowest carbon emissions per unit of
product or energy output in an industrial sector in the years 2007–2008. Early
2018 the European Council approved the legislative proposal for the EU ETS after
2020, published by the Commission in 2015 (COM, 2015 337 final), which con-
tinues the free allocation of allowances to carbon-intensive sectors for the period
2021–2030.
The EU’s decision to make the sale of allowances at auction the principle,
and allocation for free the exception, contradicts the view that regulated com-
panies largely dictate the rules for an emissions trading system. However, at the
time the decision to auction allowances was taken, the lobbying by regulated
energy companies and industrial sectors was counteracted by an unanticipated
lobby of electricity consumers. Emission rights had been handed out for free to
electricity producers that passed on the opportunity cost of the free allowances
in the price of electricity. Profits of the electricity industry swelled, as economic
theory predicts. This led to political turmoil after the start of the EU ETS in 2005
(Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006). Consumers refused to swallow the increase in the
price of electricity, full of indignity about having to pay for something obtained
for free by the manufacturer (Woerdman et al., 2009). This consumer opposition
gave the European Commission the political room to impose allowance auction-
ing on electricity producers and to start with a transition towards auctioning for
the exposed industry.
Where allowances are (still) allocated for free, regardless of the sector,
newcomers and established companies expanding their production capacity
(in excess of 10%) are allocated rights for free as well. A new entrants’ reserve
has been created for this category, equalling 5% of the total number of rights.
The allowances are allocated for free or sold at auction in the same way as this is
done for comparable established plants. In the case of plant closure and a
significant cutback in production capacity, the rights obtained for free have to
be surrendered. Any rights left over in any year after deducting rights allocated
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for free are sold at auction. Any rights remaining in the new entrants’ reserve are
also sold at auction. The rule stipulating that all allowances not allocated for
free must be sold at auction is aimed at ensuring that the full quota of available
rights enters the market each year.
The allocation of free allowances for newcomers and for major expansions
is, in principle, based on the capacity of the production facility, measured by its
potential standardized emissions. However, in subsequent decisions in the year
2011 (on the basis of the so-called ‘Comitology’ procedure), the EU has elabo-
rated the new rules by implicitly bringing in the level of operations relative to
capacity as an additional criterion for the allocation of free allowances. A
‘partial cessation of operations’ (PCO) rule stipulates that if the level of opera-
tions (e. g. production) is cut back below a given percentage of potential opera-
tions (hence capacity) for which allowances have been handed out, the number
of free rights will be adjusted in discrete steps (COM, 2011: 43). Roughly speak-
ing, if production decreases by less than 50% no emission rights will be lost, but
50% of the initial rights will be cancelled if production falls to a level between
50% and 25% of capacity. Allowances are reduced to 25% of capacity if
production is lowered to less than 25% but still above 10% of capacity. A
reduction of production to less than 10% of capacity leads to cancellation of
all free allowances. If production is increased again and exceeds these threshold
percentages, free allowances are adjusted upwards accordingly.
To tackle the problem of over-allocation of allowances, the Council of
Ministers of the EU decided in 2015 to add a Market Stability Reserve (MSR) to
the EU ETS (COM, 2014 0020 final). Although this is an important step in
addressing oversupply, we will not discuss the MSR since this reserve does not
change the operation of the EU ETS based on its expansion and closure rules.
Moreover, the EU ETS will operate under revised rules as of 2021, in which the
allocation of free allowances will be based on actual production figures instead
of production capacity (Directive (EU) 2018/410). Although this is highly rele-
vant, our paper analyses the rules of the current compliance period (2013–2020)
in comparison with the previous periods (2005–2012), leaving an analysis of the
rules that will apply in the next period (2021–2030) for future research.
5 Economic consequences of the revised rules
This section focuses on the industrial sectors exposed to international competi-
tion where all allowances are allocated for free. Two questions will be answered.
Firstly, how does the revised set of rules for free allowances under the current
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EU ETS (2013–2020), as described in the previous section, operate from the
perspective of efficiency? Secondly, what are the similarities and differences in
design and performance of the EU ETS compared to cap-and-trade and tradable
reduction credits?
To answer these questions, a distinction must be made between the corpo-
rate decision regarding the expansion of capacity and its decision on how to use
installed capacity. The decision on capacity is for the long run which involves
expectations on long-run demand for output, including uncertainties about its
future development. Firms under the EU ETS that are exposed to international
competition have the additional option to plan capacity because they can then
claim free allowances that might possibly be sold at a profit. The decision to use
capacity that has been installed, fully or partly for the production of output, is a
short-run decision for a year or an even shorter period. Firms under the EU ETS
that receive allowances for their capacity have the option of not using the full
capacity for producing output which gives them scope for selling allowances.
The next two subsections will clarify how the EU ETS influences the two
aforementioned decisions and their efficiency. We will first discuss the corporate
decision on capacity and then on output. To make our stylized exposition as
simple as possible, we make four assumptions that should be stated from the
outset:
(a) we assume the same emissions price under cap-and-trade and under credit
trading;
(b) we assume that abatement costs are part of the fixed cost of capacity in
the firm’s long-run decision on capacity and that in the short-run decision
the firm complies with the restriction on its emissions by adjusting output
in combination with buying or selling allowances;
(c) we assume that the firm gets exactly as many emission rights per unit of
output as it needs;
(d) we assume that the operations in a new installation of an existing firm that
has expanded its capacity do not affect profits in the rest of its business.
We wish to stress that these assumptions can only generate a partial analysis,
for instance because emission prices would differ between cap-and-trade (lower)
and credit trading (higher) in reality.
5.1 The corporate decision on capacity
New companies and companies expanding capacity face a choice: capacity can
be planned (a) for producing output, (b) for claiming allowances, or (c) both.
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If similar established plants are already receiving allowances for free, allowan-
ces are also allocated for free to companies expanding their capacity. In our
discussion of decisions under the various instrument variants, we shall focus on
the individual firm and assume it operates on a market for output and a market
for allowances with perfect competition. As a consequence, price Pq for output q
and price Pa for allowances are given. Furthermore, the variable production cost
V, expended on raw materials, fuels and labour, is constant per unit of output.
Per unit of output one allowance is needed to cover emissions. The total fixed
cost of capital invested in capacity for 100 units of output is F, made up of
depreciation, interest and a surcharge for profits. Therefore, the normal
fixed cost per unit of output (with full use of capacity for producing output) is
F/100 = fn.
To assess whether investing in expansion of capacity fully used for the
production of output is profitable, the revenue of output has to be compared
with the cost of output. Crucially, what is included in the cost depends on the
design of the emissions trading instrument. In a pure cap-and-trade scheme the
cost components are the fixed cost of capacity, variable production costs
and the opportunity costs of allowances. Using symbol q for output, the condition
for making profits is then (Pq – V – Pa).q > F, or per unit of output (Pq – V – Pa) >
fn. Under credit trading, mandated emissions are for free and the condition for
profits is (Pq – V) > fn. The same holds for the EU ETS (before as well as after the
introduction of the PCO rule): the allowances needed to cover emissions released
in producing the good are not part of the cost of output because they come for free
with the additional capacity. The condition for making a profit on output, with full
use of capacity, is (Pq – V) > fn. In planning capacity for output, the EU ETS
therefore operates in a way similar to a credit trading scheme. However, before the
PCO rule was introduced in the EU ETS, the management of the firm had the
alternative to invest in expansion of capacity with the aim to sell the allowances
granted for the added capacity. Investment exclusively for receiving allowances is
profitable if the allowance price exceeds normal fixed cost (both calculated per
unit of output): Pa > fn. Evidently, management will choose to invest in capacity
for output if (Pq – V) > Pa.
In Table 1 the decisions on capacity in four design variants of emissions
trading are compared for various price scenarios. The first price scenario in the
table assumes a relatively high price of output, which results in the net revenue
of output exceeding the allowance price, hence (Pq – V) > Pa. Further we assume
(Pq – V – Pa) > fn. Expected profits from investing in capacity for output are
positive in all four designs of emissions trading and in the EU ETS they are
higher than investing in capacity for the allowances they yield. As a conse-
quence, management plans capacity for output.
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Price scenario two has a high allowance price relative to the net revenue of
output. Investment in capacity for output is then not economically feasible in
cap-and-trade, but it is in credit trading, as is shown in Table 1. In an EU ETS
without PCO, investment in output and in allowances are both economically
feasible, but investment in capacity to receive allowances is the most profitable
one, since Pa > (Pq – V). The EU ETS with the PCO rule sets a restriction on
obtaining free allowances for capacity (COM, 2011: 43). To be entitled to
allowances corresponding with a full capacity level of operations, at least
50% of capacity should be used for producing output. When it is lower, at
least 50% of the free allowances granted for capacity is cancelled. The PCO
rule ensures that planning capacity solely for obtaining allowances is legally
not a feasible option. The second-best choice is to plan capacity that will be
used for 50% to produce output and for 50% to obtain allowances. In order to
make positive profits the ‘joint’ product, consisting of 0.5 unit of output plus
0.5 allowance, should exceed the normal fixed cost per unit of installed
capacity: 0.5 (Pq – V) + 0.5 Pa > fn. Price scenario two assures that the condition
is fulfilled and that the investment delivers a profit. Although profit is lower
than from investing in capacity exclusively for allowances as was possible
Table 1: Capacity planning under four emissions trading designs.
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before the introduction of the PCO rule, it is higher than profit from investing
in capacity solely for output.
In price scenario three the price of output is so low that the net revenue of
output (Pq – V) is below the normal fixed cost of capacity per unit of output fn.
The net revenue of output can even be negative. Planning capacity for output is
neither economically feasible in cap-and-trade nor in credit trade. In an EU ETS
without PCO rule investment in capacity for allowances would be profitable
thanks to the high price of allowances (one per unit of output) which exceeds
the normal fixed cost of capacity per unit of output. In the EU ETS with PCO rule
that option is closed. However, it is legally possible and economically feasible to
plan partially for output as a strategy to obtain allowances that can be sold on
the allowance market: 50% use of capacity for output entitles the firm to 100%
allowances of which 50% can be sold. Such investment in capacity is profitable
as long as the price of allowances is sufficiently high to overcompensate the loss
on selling the associated unit of output; that is (Pa – fn) > (Pq – V – fn). It then
makes planning of capacity half for output and half for allowances the only
profitable option in the EU ETS with PCO rule. Planning based on 50% capacity
use, of which 25% for production of output and 25% used for receiving the extra
allowances would double the normal fixed cost per unit of output compared to
the ‘fifty-fifty’ option. It is evidently less profitable and therefore irrelevant for
capacity planning (which is even more true for planning capacity producing at
10% capacity use to obtain 25% of potential emission allowances).
Finally in price scenario four the price of allowances and the net revenue
from output are both below normal fixed cost. In that case, in none of the four
design variants of emissions trading planning expansion of capacity is
profitable.
To assess the efficiency of the four design variants in relation to planning
capacity, we first compare the results for price scenario two in Table 1. Here
the EU ETS with PCO rule looks like a compromise between the EU ETS before
the PCO rule and credit trading, with respect to its incentive on the purpose
of the capacity investment. However, in price scenario three it turns out that if
the price of output is so low that credit trading is economically not feasible,
the EU ETS with PCO rule still encourages investment in capacity. We have
observed before that credit trading is inefficient due to its hidden subsidy in
the form of free mandated emissions per unit of output, whereas in cap-and-
trade each unit of emissions has a price which makes the scheme efficient in
total output and abatement. The EU ETS with PCO rule adds to the inefficiency
of credit trading by granting one extra free allowance next to the free allow-
ance used to cover the mandated emissions of a unit of output. Therefore, from
a social welfare point of view, capacity created for the allowances they deliver
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constitutes a waste. We conjecture that the insertion of the PCO rule is
intended to mend this potential inefficiency, but the repair is only partial
and has the impact of strengthening the incentive to plan capacity basically
for the sake of the allowances that can be claimed.
In price scenarios two and three the allowance price is so high that the
market value of allowances used to compensate CO2 emissions per unit of output
exceeds the net revenue of output and also the fixed cost of capacity (mainly
depreciation and interest) per unit of output. Is it possible that in the period
2013–2020 such a situation has been or might become real for individual firms
within the various industries under the EU ETS? To provide an illustration we
have selected the iron and steel industry of the EU, which is one of the highest
emitters in the EU ETS and also one of the sectors most exposed to international
competition. The price and costs for the product ‘hot rolled coil’ are presented in
Table 2, referring to iron or steel rolled at very high temperatures (Metal Bulletin
Research, 2009).1
The outcome of Table 2 is that (Pq – V) > fn > Pa. Note that, here, Pa =€ 24.30
stands for the revenue of the allowances that become available by not producing
one unit of output. If the metal corporation’s management was to base its long-
run expectations on the current rules of the EU ETS and on our simulation of
2018 prices and costs, it would conclude that scenario one is relevant. Given the
Table 2: Price and costs per metric ton of ‘hot rolled coil’ (Q4 2009 at price level
2018).
Price € .
Variable costs € .
Net revenue from investing for output (Pq – V)
_ _______
€ .
Capacity costs per unit of output (fn) € .
Profit from investing for output (Pq – V – fn)
_ _______
€ .
Revenue from investing for allowances (Pa) . x € .= € .
1 The figures have been converted from dollars into euros at the average exchange rate of 2009,
that is € 0.72/$ and are expressed in prices of 2018 using the historic harmonized inflation rate
for Europe which is 13.8% for the period 2009–2018. The CO2 emissions rate of 1.8 ton of CO2
per ton of crude steel is based on the blast furnace and basic oxygen furnace production
processes (Wörtler et al., 2013) and assuming a reduction of the CO2 emissions rate by 5%
due to technical progress over the period 2010–2018.
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price and costs of output, scenario two steps in if the revenue of allowances,
calculated per unit of output, exceeds the € 67.20 of net revenue that would be
cashed if the unit of output was produced and sold, and the allowances used to
compensate the emissions. That would imply a price per allowance higher than
€ 37.33, whereas the actual allowance price in April 2018 was between € 13 and
€ 14. Scenario three can only become actual if the net revenue of output sinks
below the capacity cost of € 54.90 per unit of output. That could happen due to
a fall in the price of steel of 3% or more, and hand in hand with a price per
allowance above € 30.50. Such a coincidence would bring the net revenue from
investing in capacity for output below the profit from investing in capacity for
allowances. Scenario four, with no investment in capacity, would materialize
after a drop in the price of steel similar to scenario three and with the price per
allowance at a level of e. g. €13 to €14 as it was in April 2018. The figures thus
suggest that for the period 2013–2020 scenario one is the most likely scenario
and scenario four a possibility.
However, an important qualification needs to be made with respect to the
data of Table 2, namely that this numerical illustration only gives a rough
indication. In the real world there is a considerable variety in types of steel
products and their prices as well as in the production processes and their costs.
Variations in product price and variable cost can make that at times net revenue
of output is negative. Under such circumstances scenarios two and three will
become a reality only if the firm’s management strongly believes that the
momentary relation between prices and costs is here to stay.
5.2 The corporate decision on output
Once capacity has been installed and operations have started, a firm needs to
make decisions frequently on the level of output and of allowance sales for the
current period. Markets change: demand and market prices today can diverge
from those in the past. Suppose that the present price of output is below the level
expected when capacity was planned. However, the capacity is there. The fact that
it is partly redundant for production cannot be undone and the cost of capacity is
sunk. The loss has to be taken and the cost of capacity is not included in the short-
run costs of producing output. This holds for all four designs of emissions trading.
In an EU ETS without PCO rule it has a peculiar consequence for the manner in
which the scheme operates. The existing capacity determines the number of free
allowances allocated to the company. The alternative for using those allowances
for production is to sell them on the allowance market. There is now an opportu-
nity cost attached to the use of allowances to cover emissions generated in
Emissions Trading Hybrids 19
Brought to you by | University of Groningen
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/23/19 10:53 AM
producing output, because by using the allowances the company foregoes the
revenues it would have obtained if it had sold those rights. Consequently, in the
short run when capacity is given, the opportunity cost is part of the cost of the
product in an EU ETS without PCO rule. Producing output gives a profit if the price
of output exceeds the cost, which in the short run consist of variable production
cost plus the opportunity cost of the allowances. The cost of output in an EU ETS
without PCO rule is then equivalent to the cost of output in the textbook model of
cap-and-trade. In both schemes, the allowance price is a component of the cost of
output, while in both schemes capacity costs are not included in the short-run
costs of output. Therefore, in the short run an EU ETS without PCO rule is
equivalent to cap-and-trade, which can also be seen in Table 3. It should be
noted that in discussing the short-run decision on output we shall assume that in
all five scenarios the available capacity is equal to the expected long-run level of
price scenario one. Therefore capacity is never a constraint on output, but capacity
is partly or fully redundant for the production of output in short-run price
scenarios two through five.
After capacity has been installed, its costs are sunk. They are not a part of the
short-run cost when the decisions on output and possibly on allowance sales are
made. It means that to make Table 1 relevant for the short run, one has to set
fn = 0 in its first column; by doing so one gets the first two price scenarios of
Table 3 and the first terms of price scenario three.
Table 3: Short-run output and allowance sales under four emissions trading designs.
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We shall first discuss the EU ETS without and with the PCO rule. In the short
run, the available capacity can be used for producing and selling output or for
selling the allowances that have been gained and are fixed in number. In an EU
ETS without PCO rule the costs of output consist of the variable production cost
plus the opportunity cost of allowances. In price scenario one in Table 3 the net
revenue of output (Pq – V) is higher than the revenue from not using the
allowance for production but selling it (Pa). The firm will therefore use 100%
of capacity for producing and selling output. This decision is consistent with its
planning of capacity for output: the firm has planned capacity for output and
will sell output.
In a similar way one calculates that in price scenario two, with its relatively
high allowance price, the firm has planned capacity for allowances in an EU ETS
without PCO rule and in the short run it will sell allowances. The consistency
between long-run and short-run decisions is the consequence of prices that in
the short run do not deviate from the price expectation for the long run on which
capacity planning was based. However, using capacity exclusively for the enti-
tlement it gives to free allowances is no option under the PCO rule: using 50% of
capacity for allowances is the (legal) maximum, implying that the other 50%
has to be used for output. Per unit of capacity (of which the cost is sunk) the firm
delivers a ‘joint’ product, as we said before, defined as 0.5 unit of output
plus 0.5 allowance. Given the relatively high allowance price, the short-run
revenue of the ‘joint’ product is more profitable than using the full capacity
for production and selling the output. Again the decision for the short run is in
line with the investment in capacity planned for the long run. In the numerical
illustration provided in Table 2 and assuming an allowance price of € 13.50, the
switching point that makes scenario two real is attained when the net revenue of
output of € 67.20 is equal to the potential revenue of allowances set free by not
producing a unit of output, that is 1.8 x € 13.50 =€ 24.30. The difference is
considerable and makes scenario two not very likely for the period 2013–2020.
When a firm uses 50% of capacity for producing output, the PCO rule
implies that next to the allowance to compensate emissions the firm receives
per unit of output one allowance that can be sold. It is a subsidy in kind, which
may give the firm an incentive to accept production of output that can only be
sold at a loss. This is profitable if the revenue of selling an allowance (Pa)
exceeds the negative short-run revenue of a unit of output (Pq – V). However,
the switch to the company’s last stand option of setting output at 10% of
capacity, which entitles the firm to receive allowances equal to 25% of capa-
city (that is 2.5 allowances per unit of output), is already attained before the
loss on output has fallen to equality with the allowance price. The breakeven
point for switching is where the profits of the two options are equal, that is 50
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(Pq – V) + 50 Pa = 10(Pq – V) + 15 Pa. The solution is (Pq – V) =– 0.875 Pa. It is
in Table 3 the lowest feasible (negative) net revenue per unit of output in
scenario three.
When (Pq – V) is even lower than – 0.875 Pa, then the firm is in scenario
four. Assuming in scenario four an allowance price of € 13.50, and therefore a
potential revenue from selling allowances instead of output of 1.8 x € 13.50 =€
24.30, the breakeven point for a switch to 10% use of capacity for output is
attained when the net revenue of output is negative and equal to – 0.875 ×€
24.30 =€ – 21.26. That would happen if the price of output would fall by 5.2%.
Note that at a lower allowance price of € 7, as it has been for a long time in the
period 2013–2020, a drop in the steel price of 3% would suffice to make scenario
four real.
Thanks to the 1.5 allowance subsidy additional to the allowance needed to
cover emissions from producing the output, total profits in scenario four are
positive as long as the negative net revenue of output is less than 1.5 times the
price of an allowance. In price scenario five a loss on output of more than 1.5
times the allowance price forces management to terminate output and accept
that all allowances for capacity are cancelled.
We now turn to comparing the levels of output and (if relevant) of allow-
ances in the four different design variants of emissions trading in Table 3. The
table shows in scenario one, with the net revenue of output above the allowance
price, that in the short run capacity will be fully used for producing output in all
four designs and no allowances will be left. In scenario two, where the net
revenue from selling output – albeit positive – is lower than the allowance price,
the firm operating under a cap-and-trade scheme will stop using capacity for the
production of output and sell its unused allowances. This would also occur in an
EU ETS without the PCO rule. A difference, however, is that in the textbook
model of cap-and-trade the firm will shut down capacity in the long run in
response to persistently lower output, whereas in an EU ETS without the PCO
rule capacity will be maintained to retain allowances.
The introduction of the PCO rule changes that: in scenario three, half of
capacity is used for output and half of capacity is kept for the free allowan-
ces it yields, which are then sold. The strategy can be sustained, even when
the short-run net revenue from output is negative and the allowance price is
high enough to overcompensate the loss, as it is in scenario three. The fourth
scenario shows that it is even possible to survive a loss of just below
1.5 times the allowance price by using 10% of capacity for production of
output. By contrast, in a credit trading scheme the firm will terminate
production completely as soon as the short-run net revenue from output is
negative, as happens in scenario three.
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In the scheme of cap-and-trade we assume that allowances have been
allocated for free and capacity is such that all free allowances are used for
covering emissions if capacity use is at 100%. When the firm decides not to use
capacity for producing output it can sell all allowances.
By comparing Tables 1 and 2 we get the full picture of how the PCO rule
influences corporate decisions. Table 1 shows that in the EU ETS with PCO rule
planning of capacity for output comes to a halt when the net revenue of output
and price of allowances – although both still positive – have fallen below the
normal fixed cost of capacity (per unit of output). With regard to planning of
output on existing capacity, Table 3 shows that producing output does not stop
before the net revenue of output has plunged so deep in the negative that even a
subsidy of 1.5 times the market value of allowances granted per unit of produced
output is of no help. The PCO rule is therefore an instrument to support industry
in continuing production on existing capacity in times of low to very low prices
of output. The allowance subsidy will have far less impact in stimulating
investment in expansion of capacity because that requires an implausibly high
allowance price.
5.3 ‘The devil is in the PCO rule’
As we have seen above, successive adjustments to the EU ETS have brought
about remarkable transformations in an emissions trading system that was
initially set up on the basis of an efficient cap-and-trade design feautures. The
regulatory changes have altered long-run planning of capacity as well as short-
run output decisions. In particular the amendment of 2009 to grant free
allowances for output capacity as of 2013, instead of the original absolute
cap on emissions per firm, changed the cap-and-trade scheme into a hybrid
system. Firstly, in a company’s long-run planning of output capacity this
hybrid works out in a way similar to credit trading. Secondly, with regard to
making the short-run decision on output this hybrid kept the features of cap-
and-trade: output is set at a level lower than in a pure credit trading scheme.
However, the introduction of the PCO rule in 2011 brought a far-reaching
change in the incentives that drive the management’s decisions in long-run
planning of capacity as well as in the short-run plan on the use of capacity for
producing output. With regard to capacity use for output, Table 3 reveals that
in the face of a shrinking demand for output that show up in an ever declining
product price, the EU ETS with the PCO rule succeeds in keeping production of
output going where in the three other design variants of emissions trading
output has to be terminated (sooner or later). The explanation lies in the
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double implicit subsidy embedded in the EU ETS with PCO rule: (1) the subsidy
in the form of free allowances in relation to planning capacity of output, and
(2) the subsidy in the form of extra allowances when capacity is not fully used
for producing output. We have shown above that the latter can increase to
such an extent that it covers 150% of the loss on output. Where the first type of
subsidy is also granted in a credit trading scheme, the second one is unique for
the EU ETS in its present design. As always, ‘the devil is in the detail’: the
introduction of the PCO rule is a regulatory addition that nevertheless marks a
striking U-turn in how the EU ETS works out in periods of a very low product
price relative to the allowance price.
6 Impact on carbon leakage and competitiveness
According to Article 10 of the amending Emissions Trading Directive 2009/29/EC,
the new rules have been designed for the purpose of (a) preventing carbon leakage
and (b) protecting the competitiveness of exposed industries. As explained before,
carbon leakage refers to the relocation of companies, and thus emissions, to
countries outside the EU where an emissions pricing system has not (yet) been
adopted. There was and still is discussion about how big this problem will become
in reality. There has hardly been any carbon leakage from the EU in the past (e. g.
Dechezleprêtre et al., 2014; Naegele and Zaklan, 2019) and various authors also
expect only limited (or even negative) leakage for the future (e. g. Heilmayr and
Bradbury, 2011; Gerlagh and Kuik, 2014). The latter is indeed a plausible scenario,
because the number of carbon pricing schemes around the world is steadily
increasing (World Bank et al., 2017: 26–27), because policy-induced low-carbon
innovations are likely to spread across countries and because other cost factors
than the relatively limited EU ETS compliance costs are more important in the
decision whether or not to relocate investments or production abroad (e. g. Sijm
et al., 2004; De Cian and Parrado, 2018). Evidently, the minimization of carbon
leakage goes hand in hand with a mitigation of the negative effects that European
climate policy has on the competitive strength of fuel-intensive EU firms operating
on the world market. For a given carbon leakage risk, Martin et al. (2014) calcu-
lated that the current rules of the EU ETS lead to substantial overcompensation.
What can we conclude based on our conceptual analysis of different emissions
trading design variants? In other words: what will the contribution of the EU ETS
be to the aforementioned two objectives (of Article 10)?
In a worst-case scenario, a dramatic fall in world market demand for output
of the exposed sector lets the price sink so deep that the net revenue per unit of
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output becomes negative, but (in absolute terms) not more than the allowance
price, similar to price scenario three in Table 3. As a reaction, companies will
refrain from expanding capacity and curtail the use of existing capacity for
production of output to 50%. The EU ETS has the feature that – unlike credit
trading – it raises the implicit subsidy in years of depressed demand for the
output of exposed sectors. The position of exposed European firms on the world
market is strengthened when they most need it which may keep plants and their
fuel-intensive output within the EU. Compared to cap-and-trade this advantage
is not so clear. Using a real-business-cycle model, Fischer and Springborn (2011)
find that cap-and-trade has the property of damping the volatility of output
compared to credit trading. If one accepts this finding, cap-and-trade does
without subsidy what the EU ETS performs only thanks to its implicit subsidy.
The caveat here is that Fischer and Springborn (2011) have modelled a closed
economy, while our analysis relates to an open economy. A fall in product price,
initially seen as temporary, could be the first signal of structural change with
world demand turning away from established sectors in favour of upcoming new
industries. Under such circumstances, we have shown that the EU ETS would
basically prolong the death struggle of a doomed industry.
Extrapolating present trends in the exposed sectors until 2020 and based on
the EU Reference Scenario even to 2030 (Capros et al., 2016), we see price
scenario one in Tables 1 and 2 as the most plausible for the near future: the
price of output exceeds the normal fixed cost of capacity plus variable produc-
tion cost and also the cost of allowances. In their long-run planning of capacity
and in the short-run decision on output, companies in the exposed sector under
the EU ETS with PCO rule have exactly the same cost as they would have to
make under a credit trading scheme. Capacity and output are higher than under
a pure cap-and-trade scheme and this capacity will be fully used for output. The
free allowances for capacity are not an opportunity cost and therefore not
included in the cost of output, which strengthens the position of the exposed
European sectors on the world market so that the risk of carbon leakage is lower
than it would be under a pure cap-and-trade scheme.
However joyful as this scenario may be for the exposed industries, the
success of the EU ETS in supporting their competiveness and in lowering
potential carbon leakage comes at the price of higher costs of reducing green-
house gas emissions. In planning for the long run, the opportunity cost of free
allowances is not signalled in the long-run marginal cost of output of the
exposed sector. When the markets for output and allowances would have out-
comes that come close to perfect competition (an assumption that we will relax
below), the levels of both capacity and output of the exposed sector are ineffi-
ciently high. Furthermore, the boost given to output of the exposed sectors,
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compared to other sectors that have to buy all allowances at auction, tends to
raise emissions in the EU. This therefore requires more stringent carbon stan-
dards per unit of output than the carbon emissions per unit of output would
have been if a cap-and-trade scheme were in place, thus pushing up the costs of
abatement of CO2 emissions in all sectors. The total costs of emission reduction
are higher than they would be without the special protection that the EU ETS in
its present design gives to the fuel-intensive exposed sector. An extra complica-
tion is that companies in the non-exposed sectors (mainly electricity producers)
have to buy all their allowances at auction, that is, in a cap-and-trade scheme.
From our theoretical exposition given above, it follows that when allowance
trading is permitted between the two distinct markets for emission rights,
companies in the exposed sector in need of credits prefer to buy allowances in
the non-exposed sector, either at auction or from companies, because the
allowances are cheaper than credits. In the new equilibrium, the merged market
has a uniform price for allowances and credits. The exposed sector will benefit
from lower cost, a stronger export position and higher output, to the detriment
of the non-exposed sector where costs of mitigating emission of greenhouse
gases are now higher and output lower. In this way the inefficiency in the
exposed sector spills over to the non-exposed sector and enhances the welfare
loss caused by the design of the EU ETS for the exposed industries.
Instead of assuming perfect competition one might adopt the view that
markets for output in the EU are characterized by imperfect competition. In a
Cournot model, De Vries et al. (2014) show that cap-and-trade entails higher
welfare than credit trading, because the latter leads to too many clean firms in
long-run equilibrium (assuming free entry and exit). In our paper, however, we
analyse the hybrid case of the EU ETS. Suppose that there is market power with
high product prices leading to a level of output below the welfare maximizing
level. If that were the case, our analyses above suggests – in (plausible) price
scenario one – that the current EU ETS with the PCO rule will function as a
credit trading scheme pushing up output to a level closer to the welfare
maximum. This may sound desirable from a law and economics perspective,
but we wish to stress that it is not. Firstly, it is a complete contradiction to
bemoan on the one hand a sector as being exposed to murderous international
competition and on the other hand to qualify it as an industry with the market
power to set prices. Secondly, in our view the second-best policy idea to correct
a distortion of competition on one (product) market by creating a distortion on
another (allowance) market is a blunder. Implicitly, this view assumes a
holistic regulator in the EU with almost perfect knowledge and control. In
the absence of a such a European authority, we recommend straightforward
first-best policies. We advise to attack the distortion where it appears: should
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there be market power in the exposed sector then antitrust policy would have
to be applied, while the problem of climate change requires a cap-and-trade
policy.
The EU made an excellent start by choosing cap-and-trade as the flagship of
its climate policy, but the devil is clearly in the details of emissions trading
design. The EU ETS has evolved into a sub-optimal instrument not by chance but
by choice, which points at regulatory failure. In an undesirable scenario, coun-
tries or regions considering the introduction of greenhouse gas emissions trad-
ing may follow the bad example set by the EU that choses to erect special
protection rules for the fuel-intensive exposed sector. In that case, the world
ends up with (perhaps some linked) emissions trading schemes that come close
to credit trading for fuel-intensive sectors exposed to foreign competition, which
basically amounts to an international system of hidden output subsidies for
exposed sectors. Unlike some other authors, such as Meunier et al. (2014), we do
not think that full-blown credit trading (or: ‘output-based allocation’) for the
exposed sector is the efficient way to go for the EU ETS. Instead we argue in
favour of the first-best solution of cap-and-trade which avoids the aforemen-
tioned subsidies by directing the costs of residual emissions to the sectors where
they are actually made.
7 Conclusion
Emissions trading is an effective and efficient instrument for climate policy
provided that policymakers stick to cap-and-trade. Under cap-and-trade every
unit of emissions has a cost, also in case of free allocation. Under credit trading,
however, a firm only pays for abatement and not for mandated residual emis-
sions which therefore entails an implicit output subsidy.
The EU currently operates a hybrid system for trade in greenhouse gas emissions,
combining elements of both cap-and-trade and credit trading (or: performance stan-
dard rate trading). We have demonstrated that the legal rules based on this hybrid
may trigger overinvestment in energy-intensive production capacity. Inefficiencies in
the current period 2013–2020 arise in particular from the rules that tie mandated
emissions to production capacity and to the utilization degree of that capacity. The
result is a sub-optimal EU Emissions Trading ‘Hybrid’ (‘EU ETH’) that makes the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions more costly for society than ought to be.
In designing climate law the EU had to make a choice between maximizing
efficiency or minimizing carbon leakage. In the preparation phase, policymakers
focused on economic efficiency by selecting cap-and-trade. The cost of containing
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carbon emissions (in terms of loss of consumer plus producer surplus) is then
minimized, while the possibility of some carbon leakage is accepted. However,
consecutive changes to the rules of the EU ETS softened the climate regime for the
industrial sectors that are exposed to international competition. This brought an
essential reversal. In times of thriving output markets, the EU ETS in its present
form functions for the exposed industries as similar to credit trading. In a
structurally declining market for output, the current scheme would even surpass
credit trading in inefficiency.
Over the years, European policymakers have thus chosen to prioritize the
minimization of carbon leakage to the detriment of economic efficiency. This is a
questionable choice, not only because carbon leakage has remained limited so
far, but also because the number of carbon pricing schemes around the world is
steadily increasing. The EU ETS will continue to operate under hybrid rules in
the next period 2021–2030, but then the allocation of free allowances will be
based on actual production figures instead of production capacity. Future
research will have to assess the (in) efficiency of this reform under the upcoming
fourth trading period of the EU ETS.
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